They find out some "end" in the punishment, for instance, revenge and deterrence, and then in all their innocence set this end at the beginning, as the causa fiendi of the punishment, and—they have done the trick. The moralizing of the ideas of debt and duty, with their repression into bad conscience, actually gave rise to the attempt to reverse the direction of the development I have just described, or at least to bring its motion to a halt.
According to him, a moralized concept of guilt necessarily presupposes God, and so is transcendentally informed from the start. It was much more the case, as it still is now when parents punish their children, of anger over some harm which people have suffered, anger vented on the perpetrator.
This confidence demands that, on some level, we must make ourselves calculable or predictable, and for a people to be predictable, they must share a common set of laws or customs that govern their behavior.
This suspicion remains and grows. A terrible heaviness weighed them down. We find the origins of conscience, guilt, and duty in the festiveness of cruelty: In addition, here the weird knot linking the ideas of "guilt and suffering," which perhaps has become impossible to undo, was first knit together.
Fortunately that something we can infer if we take a look at the Greek gods, these reflections of nobler men, more rulers of themselves, in whom the animal in man felt himself deified and did not tear himself apart, did not rage against himself. The moralizing of the ideas of debt and duty, with their repression into bad conscience, actually gave rise to the attempt to reverse the direction of the development I have just described, or at least to bring its motion to a halt.
I believe that that fantasy has been done away with which sees the beginning of the state in some "contract. We will later on glance again at the ennobling and promotion of the gods which, of course, is totally distinct from their "sanctification": Watching suffering makes people feel good, making someone suffer makes them feel even better—that is a harsh principle, but an old, powerful, and human, all-too-human major principle, which, by the way, even the apes might agree with.
The proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of this rare freedom, this power over oneself and destiny have become internalized into the deepest parts of him and grown instinctual, have now become a dominating instinct.
But this very animal who finds it necessary to be forgetful, in whom, in fact, forgetfulness represents a force and a form of robust health, has reared for himself an opposition-power, a memory, with whose help forgetfulness is, in certain instances, kept in check—in the cases, namely, where promises have to be made;—so that it is by no means a mere passive inability to get rid of a once indented impression, not merely the indigestion occasioned by a once pledged word, which one cannot dispose of, but an active refusal to get rid of it, a continuing and a wish to continue what has once been willed, an actual memory of the will; so that between the original "I will," "I shall do," and the actual discharge of the will, its act, we can easily interpose a world of new strange phenomena, circumstances, veritable volitions, without the snapping of this long chain of the will.
The broad effects which can be obtained by punishment in man and beast, are the increase of fear, the sharpening of the sense of cunning, the mastery of the desires: The darkening of heaven over men's heads always increased quickly in proportion to the growth of human beings' shame at human beings.
Where could this have really come from in heads like the ones we have, we men of noble descent, happy, successful, from the best society, noble, and virtuous. Setting this to one side, the lawbreaker [Verbrecher] is above all a "breaker" [Brecher]—a breaker of contracts and a breaker of his word against the totality, with respect to all the good features and advantages of the communal life in which, up to that point, he has had a share.
The past, the past with all its length, depth, and hardness, wafts to us its breath, and bubbles up in us again, when we become "serious. And anyone who can still hear but nowadays people no longer have the ears for this how in this night of torment and insanity the cry of love has resounded, the cry of the most yearning delight, of redemption through love, turns away, seized by an invincible horror.
And the man on whom punishment later fell, once again like a piece of fate, experienced in that no "inner pain," other than what came from the sudden arrival of something unpredictable, a terrible natural event, a falling, crushing boulder against which there is no way to fight.
People might be more justified in asserting the opposite Popular wisdom says "Injury makes people prudent," but to the extent that it makes them prudent it also makes them bad. But have a look at our old penal code in order to understand how much trouble it took on this earth to breed a "People of Thinkers" by that I mean the peoples of Europe, among whom today we still find a maximum of trust, seriousness, tastelessness, and practicality, and who with these characteristics have a right to breed all sorts of European mandarins.
And that to which I alone call attention, is the circumstance that it is the spirit of revenge itself, from which develops this new nuance of scientific equity for the benefit of hate, envy, mistrust, jealousy, suspicion, rancour, revenge.
With what sort of expression, do you think, did Homer allow his gods to look down on the fate of men. It sharpens the feeling of estrangement and strengthens powers of resistance. How do the previous genealogists of morality deal with this problem. The magnitude of a "progress" is gauged by the greatness of the sacrifice that it requires: Pain has not the same effect with negroes.
For the most extensive period of human history punishment was not meted out because people held the instigator of evil responsible for his actions, nor was it assumed that only the guilty party should be punished.
The actual facts differ terribly from this theory. Guilt Before God, or God Before Guilt? The Second Essay of Nietzsche’s Genealogy Aaron Ridley T he second essay of Nietzsche’s “polemic,” On the Genealogy of Morals, is a rich and elusive piece, full of valuable hints and suggestions, but difﬁcult.
In this post, I briefly note some of the more interesting points that struck my notice in the second and third essays of The Genealogy of Morals.
At ii, Nietzsche articulates a view. On the Genealogy of Morals A Polemical Tract by Friedrich Nietzsche [This document, which has been prepared by Ian Johnston of Malaspina University-College, Nanaimo, BC, is in the public domain and may be used by anyone, in whole or in part, without permission and without charge, provided the source is.
Note's on Nietzsche's Genealogy. A warning. There is much disagreement in Nietzsche scholarship. Nietzsche's Genealogy of Morals Here, Nietzsche uses the term "genealogy" in its fundamental sense: an account (logos) of the genesis of a thing.
Second Essay 1. Humans are unique because they have the ability to plan for the future, and so.
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Second Essay, Sections Summary Nietzsche opens the second essay by examining the significance of our ability to make promises. To hold to a promise requires both a powerful memory--the will that a certain event should not be forgotten--and a confidence about the future and one's ability to hold to the promise in the future.Nietzsche second essay